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SOME MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ABSOLUTE 
Introduction: 
I. 
1. Preliminary definition of the term Absolute. 
a. The ultimate l y real. 
2. Rough classification of thinkers according to their 
conception of the absolute. 
a. Agnostic conception; 
Spencer. 
b. Materialistic conceptions, 
Hobbes, ~euerbach, Buchner, and Haeckel. 
c. Idealistic conceptions, 
I. Absolute Idealism 
Voluntarism • Schopemhauer 
Regel ianism - Hegel, Royce and Ca lkins. 
II. Personal Idealism 
Lot~e, Bowne, Orr, and Lei ghton. 
3. The necessary and rather arbitrary limitations of this 
discuss ion. 
a. Th e range of the discussion. 
Anti ~ - Idealistic Conceptions of the A~solute. 
1. Agnostic Conceptions. 
a. Positivists - no metaphysics (as such) 
/ Comte, John Stuart Mill~. 
( b. Spencer's Unknowable. / 
1 The much known Unknowable. 
; Spencer's affi r mations concerning his 
~ Unkno wable. Power, Will, I nfinity, 
Eterni t y, Omnipresence. 
Hume's phenomenalism, 
Would disprove substance. 
Reduces selves to fieeting and unconnected 
ideas. 
F orced to deny the ex istence of deity, 
logically. 
-~-
z. Mate rialistic Conceptions. 
a. Its principles stated by early Grecian Atomists, 
Leueippus, Democrittts. 
Its principles are: ~ 
5oo :B.C. 
1. Qualitative var ~t ies and changes are 
reduc@ble to q_uaht"d.tative terms and 
statements. 
II. The wh ole content and activity of mind 
are reduc@ble to motions of mass parti-
cles. 
III. Secondary qualities of objects are merely 
phenomena in the human organism. 
IV.Every event which occurs id the result 
alone of blind mechanical motion. 
b. Modern materialism has added only elaboration of these~ 
I • 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
Identification of brain and mind. 
Cabini~, ":Brain secrets thought as the 
liver secret€} bile.n / 
The concur~ce of :Bup~ er, etc. 
The variations of ~ndall ~nd Huxley. 
c. Materialism is absolute. 
1. "The-all-ttLat-t@r- is". 
II. And this is mat~r and its products. 
I I I. I!fa s s pa r t i c 1 e s in mot i o n 
d. The failure of materialism. 
I. Fails to account for consciousness. 
II. Contrary to the sense of freedom. 
II. Idealistic Conceptions of the Absolute. 
1. Absolute Idealism 
a. Voluntarism - s ·chopenhauer. 
I. Will and Idea. 
II. The Primal Will is:-
Groundless; Blind-stress; Unconscious Impulse, 
An endless longing at the center of the universe. 
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b. Hegelianism - Royce and Calkins as representatives. 
I. Hegelian method 
(a) Hegelian d' 'alectic. 
(b) The Absolute:-
{ I) Numerically, One and not many. 
(II) Qualitatively, Spirit or Person. 
II. Representatives - Royce and Calkins. 
(a) Miss Calkins, (Monistic idealism). 
( I) Speaks of the Absolute as Self or 
Person. 
(II) By Person she means, uA relatively 
persistent, yet changing, 
unique, comple x ,related 
being. / 7 . 
(III) Characteristics; "Per(.i. si ~ence, 
change, uniqu~ess, and 
complexity." 
(IV) Relation of the finite self to the 
Absolute Self. 
(1) Included and yet not absorbed. 
(2) Disting~ished though not sepa-
rated. 
(3) Quantitative difference. 
(V) Finite selves related through the 
Absolute. 
(l) The world a community of selves. 
(2) Finite selves enjoy a limited 
freedom. 
(VI) Further characteristics of ~b solute 
Self. 
(1) A superatemporal self. 
(2) A knowing self. 
(3) Absolute freedom 
(4) Sense experience. 
(V) Problem of evil. 
(1) Evil purely relative. 
(2) A partial view of the self. 
(VI) Finite selves and immortality. 
(b) Jos~,~ Royce. 
( i) d here is but one absolute and. f inal 
and inte~ated self,- that of the 
Absolut r 
(ii) Diff erence in conception of the Absolute 
in doctrines of Royce and Calkins is 
largely one of terminology and there-
fore does not merit separate discus-
sion in this connection. 
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iii. ObjeQ t ions to Hegelianism or Absolute 
Idealism. 
(a) Violates the sense of uniqueness 
and privacy of the self. 
(b) Finite freedom,- apparent only, 
not actual. 
(c) Fails to solve the problem of 
evil. 
2. Personal idealism, - Idealistic pluralism. 
a. Present day idealism is predominantly personalistic. 
b. Personalistic idealism traced from Leibnitz to 
Leighton. 
c. Some thin. held in common with personalistic abso-
lutism. 
i. Supreme significance of personality. 
ii. Universe a society of selves. 
iii. Basis theory of existence in a manifestation 
of personal will. 
d. Statement of main differences from personalistic 
idealism. 
1. Conceptions of the Absolute and its relation 
to finite individuals. 
(a) Personalistic pluralists deny the 
singularistic contention thu t 
finite persons only as constitu-
ent parts of the Absolute Self. 
(b) Finite selves are free to err in sin. 
11. Personalistic pluralism naturally ends in 
theism. 
III. A More Adeq_uate Discussion of that Branch of Idealism Known 
as Personalism . 
1. The above discussion of personalism gives but some of the 
general statements of the tenets of personalism. 
2. Personalism defined. 
a. Reality is a society of persons. 
b. Th e only real thing in the universe is person. 
c. One Supreme Person in the Society of persons,God. 
i. The universe depends upon His will for ex-
istence and continuance. 
11. Pijysical universe but a mode of His activity. 
d. Depends u p on the coherence theory of truth. 
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3· Arguments for the existence of God, Supreme Person. 
a. The traditional arguments. 
i. Ontological - being. 
ii. Cosmological - Universe. 
iii. Teleological - ends. 
b. Arguments of Lotze and Bowne, based upon inte ~ction. 
c. Other arguments (but stated.) 
d. Mor~l ar gument 
i. As s tated by Prof. Sorley. 
We assume reality when we experien ce value. 
ii. As stated by James Orr. 
Kant's Categorical Imperative of duty p oints 
to a source and ground of moral truth 
which we ·find implied in Christianity. 
4. The Christian view of God. 
a. Christianity is a theistic system. 
i• The first postulate of Christianity the per-
sonal, ethical, self-revealing God. 
ii. Self-revealing, - defined. 
iii. Theism cold without revelation. 
b. The revelation of God to f i nite persons. 
i. Intercommunication between persons. 
(a) lVIust postulate both finite and infinite 
persons. 
(b) Intercommunication between finite persons 
(c) Intercommunication between Supreme and 
finite persons. 
(i) The idea of a nsilent Godn is self-
contradictory. 
(ii) Tiifficulties with Hegelian view of 
intercommunication. 
ii. The philosophical basis of intercommunica tion. 
(a) The doctrine of divine immanence. 
(b) The idealistic conception of God - which 
removes crass matter and thus assures 
the free operation of the Infinite 
Spirit upon the world. 
iii. Two suggested approaches to God. 
(a) Immediate experience 
{b) Philosophical a pproach- A sincere and 
logical attempt to know the mean-
ing of life as a whole. 
(c) These approaches supplemental rather 
than contrasted. 
iv. The solving of the relation of God to 
the finite person is always and neces-
sarily colored b y one's philoso phical 
and religious outlook on life. 
c. God and the problem of evil. 
i. Physical events are not go od or bad except 
in their relation to personality . 
d. God and value. 
i. Thei sm seeks a guiding principle for the 
discrimination of values. 
ii. Such principle found alone in intrinsic 
values. 
iii. The moral order expresses the divine nature. 
iv. God is the final home of values,- the supreme 
worth. 
v. Belief in the objectivity of value leads to 
faith in the conservation of value. 
vi. Gorl is the guarantee of the conservation and 
increase of value. 
5. The effect of one's belief on one's life. 
a. "Such as men are themse lves, - such will God ap-
pear to them to be." 
i. The God of the moralist, - A great Judge and 
School Master. 
ii. The God of the priest, - Head of the celes-
trial and terrestrial hierarchies. 
iii. The God of Science,- Impersonal and inflex-
ible vi tal Law. 
iv. The God of the savage , - His ideal chief. 
b. "The kind of religion one has depends upon the 
kind of God one believes in." 
i. The kind of world we think this is will 
determine for us the kind of life we 
think is worth living. 
ii. Our views of the universe colors avery de-
partment of life. 
IV. A Brief Summation and Conclusion. 
1. The inadeQuacies of, -
a. Materialism 
b. Absolutism 
2. The satisfactoriness of, -
a. Personalism. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bowne,B.P., Pe+sonalism. Boston: Roughton Mifflin, 1908. 
Theism. N.Y. Ammerican Book Co., 1902. 
Theory pf Thought and Knowledge. N.Y.: Am.Bk.Co.~l897. 
Metaphysics. Rev. Ed. N.Y.: Am.Bk.Co., 1898. 
Immanence of God. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1908. 
Brightman,E.S., An Introdu&tion to Philosophy. N.Y.: Henry Holt co.~l925. 
Modern Idealism. The Journal of Philosophy,Sept.23,192 0. 
Calkins, M: . w., A First Book in Psychology. 4th Ed.lif.Y.:Macmillan,l918. 
The Persistant Problems of Philosophy. N.Y.:Ma.cmillan,l918. 
The Good Man and the Good. N.Y.: Macmillan,l918. 
Durant,w., The Story of Philosophy. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster,l926. 
Drake,D. and Others., Essays in Critical Realism. London; Ma cmillan,l920. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Ed• Idealism. Berkeley- Escape from 
Subjectivism. 
Falkenberg's l[odern Philosophy. Schopenhauer, Pages 537-545. 
Spence+, Pages 569 ff. Hegel, Pages 489-505. 
Flewelling,Ralph Tyler, Personalism and the Problems of Philosophy. 
N.Y.: Methodist Book Concern, 1915. 
Gallo way, G., Philosophy of Religion. N.Y.: Scribners, 1914. 
Hastings Encyclopaedia Religion and Ethics• Positivism. Vol.X,Pa ges 
120ff. 
Hocking, W. E ., The Meaning of God in Human Experience. N.Y.; Yale 
University Press, 1912. 
Holt,E.B. and Ot j ers, The New Realism, Pgs.99-l5l.N.Y.: 1'ilacmillanl912. 
Huxley's Lay Sermons. Pa ges 157-374. 
Inge,W.R., Personal Idealism and Mysticism, 3rd Ed. London: Longmans,l924 . 
James, W., Pragmatism. N.Y.: Long~ans and Green Co., 1921. 
Leighton,J•A., Man and the Cosmos. N.Y.: Appleton,l922. 
Th e Field of Philospphy. N.Y.: 192 3 . 
Macintosh,D.C., Theolo gy as an Empirical Science. London: Macmillan 
1919. 
Menzies, History of Religion. 300 Pages. 
Moore, J.s., The Foundations of Psychology. Princeton University 
Press, 1921. 
Orr, James, The Christian View of God and the World . N.Y.: Scribners,l908. 
Pringle Pattison, A.Seth, The Idea of God in Recent Philosophy,N.Y.: 
Oxford University Press, 1917. 
Perry,~.B., The Approach to Philosophy. Scribners, 1905. Ch.X, Page 
Z06ff~ 
Present Philosophical Tendencies. London: Longmans,l916. 
Radhakrishnan,s., The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy. 
London: Macmillan, 1920. 
Royce,J., The Philosophy of Loyalty• N.Y.: MacMillan, 1918. 
The Spirito~ Modern Philosophy. N.Y .: ~fucmillan,l922. 
Russell, B., Problems of Philoso phy. Ch.IX & X. N.Y.: Holt n.d. 
Schopenhauer,A. , The World as Will and Idea. London: Paul, 1906. 
Sorley, W.R., Moral Values and the Idea of God. Cambridge: University 
Press, 1919. 
SUM:tvtARY 
The conception one holds of the Absolute will largely de-
termine <bna-s entire conception of life. In the main there may be 
held three outstanding positions: - first, the position of the 
monist, who says the universe is one, and the Absolute is the sum 
total of this one of the universe; second, the position of the 
pluralist, who declares the universe is not one but many individuals; 
and the Absolute is identical with the whole; third, a position 
which embraces and in a sense reconciles the best of the preceding 
positions, in which God is the creating, sustaining cause of the 
all-that-there-is. The search then, for the ~bsolute is the search 
for the ultimately real. In our search we will traverse the fields 
of thought represented by a few outstanding thinkers of the modern 
period. 
Among the anti-idealistic thinkers no man has more influenced 
his time than Herbert Spencer1 who maintains an agnostic conception 
of the universe, namely, that the limitations of finite intelli gence 
and the nature of the universe are incompatible so that the best 
that can be said of ultimate being is that, whatever its nature it 
must always pass our grasp. Upon investigation we find however that 
Mr. Spencer's so called agnosticism bears the mark of a non-material 
pantheism. 
Since the time of the early Greek Atomists there has been 
propounded to the world the doctrine of materialism, which states, 
in the large, that the Absolute is the all-that-there-is, and, all 
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all that there is, is matter and its products. Thus the Absolute for 
materialism must be defined in terms of mass particles in motion. 
Such a position fails to account for the phenonema of consciousness 
in harmony with the scientific doctrine of the conservation of energy. 
We turn in our consideration from tbe non-idealistic to the 
idealistic conceptions of the Absolute and discover first of all 
Schopenhauer's voluntarism. This position finds the Absolute in my 
own deeper inner life which is essentially my wi ll. The world is Will-
a wi ll which exists solely because it desires to exist. Here is the 
true thing in itself. This position leads to hopeless pessimism for 
there is no escape for Schopemhauer from the endless longing and 
striving at the center of the universe. The Absolute is but blind-
stress or unconscious-impulse. 
The doctrine of Absolutism as formulated by Hegel and his 
disciples is still maintained by some few defenders of the faith. The 
Hegelian view-point differs in its monistic emphasis of the nature 
of the universe from the non-idealistic thinkers in that the kind or 
quality of the One is Self and not mere materiality. There is but 
one Absolute and final integrated self of whi ch all finite or partial 
selves are parts and in the light of which self they alone can have 
meaning, - this is the Absolute Self. The objections to Hegelianism 
or Absolute Idealism are, (l) the doctrine violates the sense of the 
uniqueness and privacy of the self, (2) finite freedom is not account-
ed for- such freedom being apparent only, (3) this doctrine fails to 
solve the problems of evil. 
We have rejected, on the whole, the conceptions of the Absolute 
propounded by both monistic and pluralistic thinkers whatever their 
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position may be qualitatively. We would now present the doctrine 
of personal idealism or personalism, which is, in the main, a 
synthetic conception combining the best in both monism and 
pluralism. Personalism states that the ultimately real is per-
son or self, that the universe is a society of selves in which 
the Supreme Person o~ Self is God upon whom the entire universe 
is depending for creation and continuance. These finite selves 
while dependent, yet are unique and free. Personalistic plural-
ism naturally ends in theism. 
The Christian view of the universe is a theistic system in 
which God is postulated as personal, ethical and self-revealing. 
In such a system the finite selves are called to cooperate with 
God in the creation and conservation of value. God is the 
guarantee of this conservation and increase of value. 
Belief in the God and universe of personalism seems to be 
the "one unifying principle that can make out of our chaotic 
life a harmonious whole of thought and feeling and action. " 
(Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman, Page 330.) 
SOME I1iiODER N CONCEPT IOiifS OF THE ABSOLUTE. 
The world in which we ·live is ~ constant source of quest ion 
asking and solving to any thoughtful mind. Questions relative to the 
cause, meaning and continuance of that which we call matter and life. 
With each new generation there arise those who lay claim to "the-
cure-all balm" for all of earth's maladies, but still problems ne w 
and multiplied persist in showing themselves to haunt the thinker. 
Like the many headed dragon of Grecian mythology, - when one head is 
successfully severed many more appear to take its place. There is one 
question which seems more comprehensive or inclusive than its fello ws,-
this fundamental question is that one which has to do with the na ture 
and meaning of the world-ground. This world-gr ound may be designated, 
and is for this "b rief treati~ the Absolute. Our conception of the 
Absolute or world-ground will largely determine our entire conception 
of life and its meaning. 
What then, is our conception of the Absolute? We would g ive 
here but a preliminary and conse que n tly not wholly satisfactory defini-
tio n o:f our conception • .. F or the monist or singularist, reality comes 
to b e reg arded as one all~compreh e nsive being, and this he declar e s as 
the Ab solute. " The Absolute is all that there is. Nothing can e x is t 
outside or apart from it. All being is deter mined by and i n c l ude d in 
it" (Introduction to Philosophy, Brightman , Page 217.) Another class 
of t hinkers, kno wn as the pluralists, who look a t things very dif f er-
~nt ly from the monist, hold that reality consists of many and not one. 
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This class of thinkers would undoubtedly admit that there is some kind 
o! unity in the universe which holds the individuals together, but they 
are yet individuals)each having i ·\J s own unique being. 
:Both the monists and the pluralists have questionspresented 
to them which are very hard to answer. It may be the truth lies in a 
mediatory position somewhere between or even within the two apparently 
very different points of view. For the monist, if he admits of God at 
all, must identify Him with the Absolute or all-that-there-is. The 
pluralist, - if he affirms that there be God, must place Him as one of 
the individuals in the universe. His relation to and importance iri 
that universe may be stated in as many and as diversified terms as there 
are thinkers who attempt to state His relation to the universe. God may 
be but a "fellow-striver" with the innumerable host of individuals that 
make up this complex universe, or He may be the creating, unifying, sus-
taining, governing and supreme individual of the universe. For the solu-
tion of these questions we present a few of the conceptions presented in 
the very restricted field represented by our rather arbitrarily chosen, 
and thus necessarily limited; company of modern thinkers. 
No single school of present day philosophy can lay claim to 
the right to define the term Absolute. The variations in the conceptions 
as 
of this term are Awidely divergent as the systems of those who submit 
the definitions. Indeed it may fairly be mainta~ned that for a meta-
physical system the conception of that which is ultimately real -- the 
Absolute, is the central idea. All other conceptions adjust them-
selves by orientation to this. 
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Their positions, always slightly different in any t wo t h i nkers 
of i ntel lectual independence, may nevertheless be roughly cla ss ified. 
Agnost ic conceptions being represented chiefly by Spence's s ynthet ic 
pbilos ophy;materialistic conceptions re p resented by Hobbes , Feurbach, 
and Buchner. As against these anti-idealistis conceptions s e vera l 
graduations in the position of idealists may be d iscriminated. Schopen-
hauer's voluntarism; Hegelianism, represented in our present d iscu ssion 
by H. oyce and Ca lkins; and finally the position of persona.lism or person-
a l idealism as represented by Lotze, Bowne and with a fe w modificat ions 
wh ich may be stated, Leighton . A treatment of these positions,although 
somewhat arbitrarily selected, together with brief references to kindred 
th inkers wi ll constitute the bulk of discussion of this treatment of 
"Some Modern Conceptions of the Absolute." 
It is evident that these theories of the Absolute r ange i n 
t heir conception from those on the one hand , that would make the Ab solu te 
to consist of a lumpish-sum-total of the constituents of the univers e 
conceived of as b_eing mass particles in mo~ ion in space through the 
~ualitatively dualistic and numerically sing~laristic position which 
would make the Absolute to consist of b oth matter and thought or con-
sciousness united in a more or less incoherent manner in an undefi ned 
common substratum, which ultimately makes them one. Such a pos it i on 
woul ~ give mind, or matter the greater significance in accordance with 
the chief interist of the individual. And finally on the ot her hand 
the qua litative monistic position, whio·h conceives of the Abs olute 
either (1) as the President of the Cosmic republic of persons , {2) as 
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creator and sustainer of all finite persons and the objective world as 
well, or of the position which is both qualitatively and quantitatively 
monistic; conceiving of the Absolute as a universal consciousness of 
which all particular selves or things are individual manifestations. 
Dogmatic Atheism, meaning by this the denial of the existence 
of an Absolute as an individual in the universe has not many philosophic 
advocates, while agnosticism, which suspends judgment or indicates that 
there is lack of evidence to postulate either the existence of, or the 
nature of, an Absolute, is not w:l.thout adherents. Among those who are 
prefessedly indifferent must be classed all positivists, the opponents 
of any metaphysics as such. Here should be included Comte and John 
Stuart Mill. While the s y stems of many influential thinkers might be 
presented in this connection there is no man who led the thought of his 
day so effectively as did Herbert Spencer. "Spencer was accepted as 
the philosophic exponent of the spirit of the age." His F irst Prin-
ciples made him "almost at once the most famous philosopher of his 
day" (The Story of Philosophy, Durant, Page 431.) Spencer's agnosticmsm 
was perhaps no more pronounced than that of others but he was given to 
a more dogmatic and_ combative discussion of the subject than were his 
contemporaries. It is his dogmatic affi~mstion based on an examination 
of! the nature and limits of h .. man intelligence that the power which 
manifests itself in consciousness and in the outward world is unknowable. 
If by this agnosticism it could be shown that 1v'Ir. Spencer meant to in-
dicate that the full comprehension of t h e ultimate Being must always 
pass our grasp, -- that in the present state of existence it is only 
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very dimly and distantly that ~ can approximate a proper conception 
of the Deity. Such an agnosticism is shared by all thinkers and is, 
therefore, not the point at issue. The real item in dispute is whether 
we may apprehend through our intellectual investigations something o£ 
this Absolute Being though it be granted we cannot know all. Despite 
his negations Spencer affirms many items of knowledge which in themselves 
. 
are fatal to his agnosticism. First of all, it is admitted that the un-
knowable exists as a power revealed in consciousness (First Principles 
pages 88, 89}. He tells us in every variety of phase that we cannot 
know the Absolute, but almost in the same breath he tells us that we 
have an idea of the Absolute which our minds are compelled to form , 
that it is a positive and not merely negative conception, and, moreover 
that we have not only a conception but a direct and immediate conscious-
ness of this Absolute ~~ending itself with all our thoughts and feelings 
a n d recogni~able by us as such. (First Principles page 88 - 9pe Again 
if we ask what is meant by the Absolute it is defined by Spencer as that 
which exists out of all relations and for this reason.the possibility 
of the knowledge of it is denied. (First Principles pages 78- 81.) 
And yet the very grounds which we have for affirming the existence of 
such an Absolute are the grounds for affirming that it stands in relation 
both to nature and to consciousness and is a constituent element in every 
idea we can form. Thus it is discovered that this Inscrutable Power is 
not absolutely unknowable. It is soon apparent that there are quite a 
number of affirmations which we are able to make concerning the Absolute. 
'l'ljis Ultimate Reality is a Power; It is a Force, the nearest analogue to 
which is our will (First Principles, Spencer, Page 189); it is infinite 
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it is eternal, it is omnipresent (First Principles, Page 199); it is 
infinite and eternal Energy from which all things proceed . ":But one 
truth", he says, "must grow ever clearer -- the truth that there is 
an Inscrutable Existence every where manifested, to which we can 
neither find nor conceive either beginning or end• Amid the mysteries 
which become the more mysterious the more they are thought abuut,there 
will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in the presence 
of one Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed." 
And. further as seen in the quotation just given, it is the Cause of 
the Universe, which idea he asserts in the ~etee nth Century, July 
1884 page 24, "I held at the outset, and continue to hold, that this 
Inscrutable E~istence which science in the last resort, is compelled 
to recognize as unreached by its deepest analysis of matter , motion, 
thought,and feeling, stands towards our general conception of things 
in substantially the same relation as does the Creative Power assert-
ed by Theology .n The Power manifested thro.ughout the Universe dis-
tinguished as material, is the same Power which in oursel ves wells up 
under the form of consciousness§»w~ile the ''nece ssity we are under to 
think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy gives 
rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the Universe." 
(First Principles , Spencer, Page 199ffj. 
We are force d, there fare , in co nc l us i on, t o a s s e r t that ][r • 
Spencer's so-called agnosticism is not an agnostic system at all, but 
his conception of the Absolute bears the mark of a non-material or semi-
spiritual pantheism. 
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In approaching the second group of thinkers and their con-
ception of the Abs olute, we are at once confronted with the bold declara-
tiona of David Hume. While it is true that Hume everywhere assumes the 
existence of a Supteme Being or Deity, it is evident that on his prin-
ciples we have no right to believe that there is a God. Indeed Hume 
never argues definitely against the existence of God, yet his efforts to 
disprove the existence of substance, material or spiritual, logically 
applies as well to God as to finite realities. There is no place in 
his philosophy for an Absolute . The same sweeping phenomenalism which 
reduced all selves to mere bundles of fleeting and unnonnected ideas, 
forces Hume, if he follows a rigidly logical course, to deny the ex-
istence of Deity . 
Materialism while arriving at the same conclusion, relative 
to the Absolute, does so on a different basis. Under the dictates of 
this doctrine the whole cat~gory of being ~i filled out by matter. Its 
principles were stated by the early Grecian Atomists as early as Leucip-
pus and Democritus nearly five hundred B.C. There are , roughly speaki ng 
four principal arguments (following Lei ghton's Field of Philosoph y pag e 71); 
I 
~ 
first, all qualfttive varieties and changes are reducible to quantitative 
terms and statements; second, all perceptions, feelings, and t h oughts,--
the whole content and activity of the mind, are reducible to the motions 
of mass particles in space~ Third, secondary qualities of objects are 
merely phenomena in the human organism. Fourth , every event which occu rs , 
every happening i n the process of things is the result a lone of blind 
mechanical motion. To these inclusive principles modern materialism has 
added only elaboration. Th e thorough going variety literally identifies 
-7-
brain and mind, -- and the movements of the brain, with the thoughts 
and feelings of which we are aware in consciousness. Brain action on 
this hypothesis is thought and feeling. "The brainn, says Cabanis, 
"secretes thought as the liver secretes bile." In essential accord 
with this are Buchner, Moleschott and Vogt, more careful writers as 
Tyndall and Huxley are given to statements which either indicate ab 
abandonment of the 9roblem of the relationship between consciousness 
and matter, or conceive of them in common terms which consistently 
give matter untimate ascendancy. nr know nothing and never hope to 
know anything" says Prof. Huxley, "of the steps by which the passage 
from molecular movements to states of consciousness is effected." 
(Contem~orary Review Nov. 1871 page 464.) And again he a .sserts speak-
ing of our thoughts as, "The expression of molecular changes, in that 
matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." 
(Lay Sermons page 152.} He speaks of consciousness as "A function of 
nervous matter when that matter has attained a certain degree of organ-
ization." ( Contemp. Review Nov. 1871 page 464. l. 
This hyphenated materia l ~at ic-idealistic theory in outcome 
escapes crass materialism only in terminQlogy and appearance. It is not 
within the scope of our purpose to discuss or refute materialism as such,-
its conception of the Absolute is our present interest. Like Absolute 
idealism it should d e fine ita Absolute as The-all-that-there-is, and a ll 
that there is, is matter and its by products. Therefore, the Absolute 
must be defined in terms of mass particles in motion and every valid 
ar gument a gainst materialism finds full cogency. The refutation of such 
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conception of the Absolute. Such a position fails to account for the 
phenomena pf consciousness in harmony with the scientifi c doctrine of 
the conservation of ·energy. Consciousness can not be properly called 
a by product of physical processes, it is rather the director and in-
vestigator of physical processes; and ab~ve all, such a theory is con-
trary to the sense of freedom in the moral individual. 
We turn iri our cdnsideration, from the non-idealistic con-
ception of the Abso lute to those that may properly be classified as 
idealistic conceptions. Our first consideration will be Schopenhauer's 
voluntarism. ~Thi le Schopenhauer's philosophy, as the philosophy of 
pessimism, is sometimes dismissed with a jesture o f tolera tion, a truer 
evaluation will discover a system of much interest and no small value. 
Beginning with an inquiry into the nature of the world he arrives at the 
conclusion that it is for each and all of us just our idea. It is there 
because we see it and as long as we see it. We comprehend our world 
through two dividing principles, namely, space and time. This external 
world is perceived through a universal form of appre h ension, that is, 
tha principle of causation. The worl d of space and time with all that 
they contain exist f~r the knowing subject. There is no cause to be 
sought beyond my own true nature for my own experiences. But what is 
my nature? My deepest nature is so superior to space and time, that 
space and time are in fact im me, in so far as they are forms of see-
ing and knowing. My true nature neither causes nor is caused and this 
same deepest nature exists in all the particualrs of the universer Only 
in space and time do there seem to be separate beings. They see m to 
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distinguish us all from one another. But ultimately abstract space 
and time with all their mani f old and illusory distinctions of places 
and moments and the real world collapse into one immanent n a ture. 
Thus in my o wn deepest nature I am one with all that ever has been or 
e v er will be either millions of a g es ago or of millions of ages to come. 
No star is so remote but that the same essential nature of things which 
is ma nifested in that star is also manifested in my body. 
In this position we find Schopenhauer's conception of the 
Absolute. I have only to find my own deepe s.t nature of which I ha ve 
an un questionable awareness. lvly whole inner life is essentia lly my 
will, - I long, I desire, I move, I act, I feel, I strive, I lament, 
I assert myself -- the common name for all this is will. The world 
is Will. I am a Will -- a will which is notthere for the sake of 
something else but which exists solely because i t desires to exist. 
Here is the true thing in itself. Since for Schopenhauer this soul 
of your soul is the capricious inner will, there is no reason to speak 
of it as God or Spirit. These word s i mply rationality and conscious 
intelligence, and will is vastly deeper than intelligence. Int e lli-
gence exists at all only as one of the caprices of this will. Thus 
the world is will and idea. This will g ive rise to Schopenhauerfs 
pessimism since will is essentially a striving and since there is 
nothing in the world deep e r than the longing, -- the unrest which is 
the very heart of willing. Therefore, there is no end of long ing 
in the world. This is the problem that leads to Schopenhauer' s pes-
s imi sm. Since there is no ultimate g oal to be realized by the striv-
ing there is no relief save in resignation -- the denial of the will 
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to live. 
In this conception of the Absolute as will, this postulation 
of an endless longing at the center of the universe, Schopenhauer has 
contrib uted a deep and fundamental insight into life. In proceeding 
down the deep declivity into pessimism he has accepted one conclusion 
from his position, but fortunately not the only one possible. It is 
possible, on the other hand, to find in this unending struggle the 
inspiration for life which has been in the vision of all the great 
poets from Homer's wanderings of the much tossed and tried Odysseus 
down to the In Memoriam of Tennyson or the dramatic lyrics of Brown-
ing. Restlessness, longing, grief are fatal evils save to the spirit 
that is strong enouz h to endure them and to make of them stepping 
stones for the greater conquests of tomorrow. lfuen one accepts this 
position he is prepared to unite with the idea -- will, that of in-
telligent moral purpose which united idea will give a rationally 
acceptable and practically livable conception of the Absolute. 
"Never has a system of thought so dominated an epoch as the philo-
sophy of Immanuel Kant dominated the thought of the nineteenth cen-
tury" (Story of Philosphy, Durant, Page 276.) "Kant's ctiticism 
of reason, and his exaltation of feeling, prepared for the voluntarism 
of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, the intuitionism of Bergson, and the 
pragmatism of James; his identification of the laws of thought with 
the laws of reality gave to Hegel a whole system of philosophy; and 
h:ia unknowable "thing-in-itself" influenced Spencer more than Spencer 
knewn (Stfj_llry of Philosophy, Durant, Page 317.) Of Schopenh.auer and 
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and Spencer we have spoken. Hegel's influence upon the stream of 
thought has been even more significant and more abiding than even 
that of Schopenhauer and Spencer. His conception of the Absolute 
is of a type not touched by other thinkers taken into account. It 
is but fitting that we should seek to know his conception of the 
Absolute. 
In endeavoring to discover the process by which Hegel 
sought to substantiate his conception of the Absolute it is neces-
sary that a brief observation of his method is desirable. It is his 
position that ~complete analysis of any wrong doctrine serves as a 
refutation, which is in reality a reinterpretation of it. Such an 
analysis begins by substituting for the conception with which one 
has started, the opposite of it, but ends by showing that the truth 
lies not in either conception as opposed to the other but in the 
third conception which unites on a higher plane the essential features 
of the initial conception and its opposite. This was Hegel's dia-
lectic. Advancing by this me thod Hegel endeavors to show th a t the 
ultimate reality is not a single limited reality -- Qne among many, - -
but is a n Ab solute One. He further maintains tha t the ultimate 
Reality is not a composite of all particular realities, tha t is, is 
neither an aggregate mor a system. Thus having ans wered, in a manner 
satisfactory t o himself, the nwnerical ~uestion he g ives his attention 
to the ~ualitative nature of the ultimate Reality, asserting that it 
is a spirit or person. In the process of his discussion he indicates 
that t h e Absolute is not adequately conceived of as mere life. Th is 
theory was advocatdd in Hegel's time by Schelling later by Spencer 
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and Haeckel. Neither may it be conceived of as a totality of par-
t i cular selves. "The highest, extremfast summit 11 , he says, 11 is pure 
Personality, which alone -- throug~ that absolute dialectic which 
in its nature encloses and holds all within itself" (Lo g ic Vlerke 
V page 339). 
Regen's philosophy of history is an endeavor to show that 
the ''procession of events in the progressive a pprehension of this 
5 
absol u te self under more and more ade quate formEi-(i;goodness is the 
ade quate relation of human beings to each other as all related to 
this larg er self; beauty is the absolute self's expression in sense 
forms; religion is the personal relation to the absolute self; and 
philosophy, finally, is the reascmned apprehension of t he Absolute " 
(Persistent Problems, Ca lkins pa ge 389.) 
Hegel's Absolute is a living process, purposive and ration-
al. The Absolute is a spiritual system, ~ wh~le of interrelated, 
living, thinking, willing beings which exist as a whole in and for 
God -- the unitary spirit of the whole. The Absolute is a Spirit 
living in His own concrete differences~ men and things. 
Acce,ting this s tatement of Hegel's conception of the 
Absolute as being a Person all inclusive and progressively attaining 
consciousness in the onward march o~ evenps we will reserve criticisms 
of absolute idealism until after brief treatments of the conceptions 
of Royce and Calkins have been successively given. Roughly speaking 
the criticisms of the systems are identical with those of their common 
master, -- Hegel. 
Miss Calkins and Royce speak of the Absolute as a self or a 
person ., ... 13-
Miss Calkins calls the system of Royce and herself a monistic personal 
idealism. She interprets He g el as holding the same doctrine. 
S ince Miss Calkins defines the Absolute as the Absolute 
Self it is necessary to ha ve a clear conception of the term s el f . Of 
this, she asserts, several definite principles {Persistent P roblems 
pag e 4 2 7), which we condense. A self, or I, or person, is not the 
entelech ist's soul, that is, the self ca nnot be conceived as having 
a decisive influence on phenomena~ In the second p lace it is not to 
be co n fused with soul in Lock's sense of the term .;that is to sa y , is 
no underlying substratum, no unknown substance.. Positively, by self 
i s meant a relatively persistent, yet changing, uni ~ue, complex, re-
lated b e ing . These ~hen are its outstanding ch~racteristics; per-
sistence, cha nge, uni queness a nd comple x ity. \fuile it may be quest i on-
ed whether she always frees herself of the soulish implications of the 
selfhood yet the above principles evidently are those which she has 
in mind when she endeavors to give t he personalistic absolute conception 
of the Absolute self. 
Referring to this same definition of self she affirms, "the 
absolutist holds that the essential characters of self as enumerated 
in the description already g iven of the human self may be attributed 
to Absolute Being. Obviously the Absolute is a persistent, a uni q_ue, 
and a complex being." f Persistent Probelms page 445.) It is of 
course necessary to determine tije relation of the individual finite 
self to this Absolute Self. It is at this point that Hegelian ab-
solutism is forced to transverse its roughest roa d. 
The individual,finite self must be regarded, she contends, 
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as being included in a very real and definite manner in the absolute 
self, and while being thus included, is not absorbed and annulled by 
the central and total self of which it is a part. This conception, 
which the pluralistic persanalist cannot brook, is supported by Miss 
Calkins by appeals to the individual periodic selfhoods of childhood, 
youth, and so-forth, which are combined within the individual; also, 
by ap peal to the study of so-called multiple personalities and the 
phenomena of abnormal psychology. There is nothing she asserts, "in 
itself incompatible with the doctrine of the finite selves as includ-
ed parts of the Absolute Self. A genuinely personal Abs olute must in-
clude all aspects of human experience• He must then be an individualiz-
ing self distinguishing each from ·each~and each from himself, the 
innumerable objects of his emotion and his will. Each finite self is 
thus a distinct expression of the individualizing emotion of the 
Absolute Self; my consciousness of my uniqueness iiLs no illusion, a nd 
t h e ultimate reason why I am I, and you are you is that each is defi-
nitely and distinctively willed by the Absolute. And yet, like all 
the lesser included selves I am distinguished though not separate from 
the absolute self and he from me. The difference is in part quantita-
tive and is evident in the fact that I do not know all the objects which 
he knows. In part, however, it is the difference of the Ab solute as an 
utterly unique person from any included self. Fr om this difference it 
follows that the lesser sel~ does not necessarily feel and wil l with 
the Absolute; whereas the absolute self besides possessing his own , 
the ultimate personality, must feel and wil l with every lesser self." 
(Persistent Problems page 470 and 471.) 
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Our interest of course is prima rily in the relation between 
the finite selves ~nd the ~Absolute Self. Y&t it is of interest to 
note that these finite selves are interrelated indirectly through the 
Absolute, though not directly each to each. Each is included in the 
Absolute Self and unites with the rest to express his complete will . 
The human world is, in other words, a community -- a totality of 
selves each with hiw own individual point of view. And further 
these finite selves are free. 
Admitt edly this position is not without difficulty to the 
absolutist. Of course this freedom is not absolute but relative. His 
freedom in which he may oppose the Absolute is an opp osition in which 
he op p oses His specific and not His inclusive purpose. "I, as chppsing 
self am object of the will of the Abs olute ; and if He proposes precisely 
my freedom then it f ollows that specific acts and momentary choices may 
be in opposition to what would have been His purpose if He had willed 
a world without me in it." (Per~istent Problems pafe 477.} And ,again, 
"in so far as He has willed me t o be free there must be or may be par-
tial phases of reality which He exp eriences but does not will." (Per-
sistent Problems page 478.} And yet again, "The Ab solute wi.lls the 
rebellious volition not as a lesser self wills it in isolation of re-
lation to the whole, but as ~part of a universe which included also 
such other purposes and fulfillments as balance or (in Royc e's fine 
phrase) 'atone for" this rebellious violation and its outcome." ( (Per-
sistent Problems page 4 78.) 
These finite selves are immortal a nd the pro of of it lies 
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not in the fact that the y long !fOr immortality, neither because the 
Absolute Self could conceivably express Himself only in immortal par-
tial selves, but because there are human beings whp know themselves 
as embodiments of unique duties and because a duty is inherently end-
less. 
We have discussed the position of two of the outstanding 
ft/ 
representatives of absolutism namely, Roy~e and Calkins, and have re-
served until now the criticisms which are common to .both. In the 
first place it is exceedingly difficult to determine vrhat kind of 
selfhood that is which is a composite of lesser selves, yet uniquely 
greater and independent of their sum total. If indeed such an Absolute 
can be properly termed a self it cannot be readily granted that the 
fractional finite beings are individually also selves. A definition 
may be indeed the beginning of all well meaning discussions, yet a defi-
nition cannot bear too much. To define a self as a "relatively persia-
tent, yet changing, unique, complex, relative being" is certainly to 
g ive it great width of latitude, and yet, hardly enough in the judgment 
of the present writer, to include, such a wide diversity of individuals 
as is re quired by the absolutists. The adding of the adjectives, finite 
and absolute does not change the p r oblem. To .call. one the to tal sel :f 
and the others fractional or partial selves may point in the right 
direction but also proportionately reduces the significance of each 
fraction. 
It does not appear to the present writer that Miss Calkins or 
any of the other absolutists succeeds in solving the significant problem 
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of freedom. To say that the f inite self is free in that he opposes 
the specific but not the inclusive purpose of the Absolute strikes 
one as being more of a verbal gesture than of a solution. If the 
reply is th a t the viol a tion is a part of the Absolute e xpe rience 
yet the Ab solute Sel:f though c onscious of it opposes li.l.t,, is to 
postulate either ~m incoherence in the · __ Absolute, which is suicidal 
to the idea, or to guarantee to t he finite self an independarice 
which bars inclusion in th e Absolute . Then finally , for the pro-
p onent of personalistic absolutism to say the solution lies i n the 
fact that the Absolute, because of His very absolutness succeeds in 
striking a balance or "atoning for~ any individual rebellious vio-
lation or collecti on of rebellious violations, is so far from solv-
ing the p roblem that when the vi o lation is stressed it strengthens 
the belief in the individuals freedom but not hi s inclusion in the 
Absolute, or when the idea of balance is stressed it strengthend 
the i mpulse tov1ards inclusion but eliminates the freedom. 
In pass~ng from the discussion of Absolute idealism with 
its numerical Monism to idealistic pluralism, personal idealism, or, 
as i t is commonly known, personalism, it may be well to note that 
present day idealism is predominantly personalisti c . This emphasis 
of personality may be traced with more or less definiteness fro~ the 
ear l y hours of the modern division of the history of philosophy 
through the monadology gf Leibniti, the person of Berkeley, the 
synthesizing mind of Kant, to the personalist of the late nineteenth 
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e and early twentieth century. Among whom are found such names as Lotze, 
1.!. .. / 
Ward, Sorley, Seth Pringle - Pattij on, and Bowne. This position has 
many things in common with personalistic absolutism. 'J.lhey hold in common 
the supreme significance of personality; that within certain limits the 
structure of the universe is a society of selves; that the external 
world gains its significance only in the light o f pe rsonality and bases 
its existence in a manifestation of personal will. But when it comes 
to the conception o~ th e Absolute and its relation to the individual 
there is a fundamental and irreconcilable divergence. Personalistic 
plurali s ts deny the singularistic contention that finite persons exist 
only as constituent parts of the one Absolute Spirit. There is nothing, 
they contend, in our normal and sane experiences which entitles us to 
say that one pers on can be;literally contained in another pers on, ene 
self simply cannot be part of a nother self. But th~ personalistic 
pluralist insists on the other hand that it belongs to the very essence 
of personality to exist only in social relatio n ships with other persons, 
therefore, for him ultimate reality consists of a society or community 
of selves, living incessantly in cownunion with one another. The 
Absolute or Perfect Self or Person who is the source or ground of its con-
tinuous movement is a per sonal Deity who is the Creator and Sustainer 
of all finite selves and things on whom they are dependant but in whom 
they are not included. 
The implications of Personalism carry us still further. 
Finite selves are f~ee to err in sin, for God has not wille d a world 
of mere mechanism but a society of persons who can will to cooperate 
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or t o oppose Him within certa in limits. It is God's will to create 
free moral agents who ca n g row into wisdom and conscious cooperation 
with Him. The whole creation moves through i t s strifes and sufferings 
toward a community of ethical and rational selves, -- to this develop-
ment of selves, evil in the world is incidental. "Value exists only 
in petsons, therefore, persons must be immortal." (Leightons Field 
of Philosophy page 418.) Persons are not trans i t 'o:]!;r express ions or 
modifications of the Absolute, -- but He is i mmanent in human life 
and in nature . God is a supe:t-persa,nal reality, JGhe Absolute Being 
wh o is the g round and goal of a ll things. Thus personalistic plural-
ism naturally ends in Theism. 
Since it is our purpose t o dwell a bit l onger in the field 
of personalistic discussion, than in tho se fields of thought which 
have preceeded, it is necessary for us to say that the preceding 
paragraphs which have dealt with the personalistic conception of . the 
Absolute have been but t he general statements of the tenets Df this 
doctrine and it is now our purp ose to go into a more detailed view 
of the subject. 
Personalism is a form of idealism, which interprets reality 
as a society of persons. In .fact, it wou ld go so far as to sta te 
tha t the only real thing in the universe is person; - all true being 
is Personal. Personalism in this sense might be called Theistic 
Idealism, which grants us the further right of adding to our def in ition 
that there is one Supreme p~rson in the society of persons and th a t 
all the universe depends upon His will fo r its existence and continu-
ance. Physical and finite persons are nothing apart from Him. The 
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ph ysical universe as a whole is but a mode of God's activity. Finite 
persons, while true and uni que selves, depend on His purpose · for 
their being ~ The supreme person wills existence of what is truly 
other than himself, so that the universe is not a single self but is 
ultimately a society of selves, as Prof. Leighton puts it (Fi e lds Phil. 
pa ge 417). The Supreme Person, "Is the source of the whole s y stem, 
t h e g round of its continuDus - movement towards fuller personal and 
communal life, and the eternally realized Ideal or Goal of the life 
of s p irits." Personalisms excuse for existence is based u p on the co-
herence theo r y of truth, the distinctness of the individual and upon 
epistemological dualism. While s orne objections have been and :' may be 
r aised, yet no objection holds water when light is shed upon the mean -
ing of t he universe as a whole. 
We will proceed to the arguments that Personalism h a s to offer 
for the existence of God. It is, howver, unnecessary t o l a borously re-
hea r se the age-worn arguments in deta i l. The traditiona l arg uments 
k n own as the ontological (theory of being ), cosmological (theory of t he 
universe), teleo]:ogical ( theory of ends) while attacked by many sin ce 
the time of Kant, still retains in a la r ge measure their old cogency~ 
These traditional arguments ha ve survived, especially the cosmolo g ica l 
a n d the teleological. Lotze and Bowne undertake to argue that the 
cau se of the world is one and notmany, and is intelligence . The y ba se 
t heir argument upon inter-action as a necessary postulate of thought 
dealing with the world~ as interacting systems. They contend tha t one 
can n p t conceive successful ~~~e_ractio n -:w_ith_out God to support it. A 
- -~- J - - -
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unitary system of interacting members is possible only through a 
unitary being, which posits and maintains them. This is a world 6f 
interaction according to law, and reason demands as the onl y satis-
factory explanation that there must be a single unitary cause or 
ground. This underlying ground must be intelligence. We necessar-
ily assume our world to be a world of meaning and law, otherwise we 
have a world of "hit and miss. 11 Sc i ence is dependent upon this . 
It is only a mind that can grasp a universal meaning and apart from 
minds universals have no meaning, only intelligence can grasp law. 
Wnile this is ondv an entirely conclusive argument, yet it is the 
mo st satisfactory hypothesis. 
While there are other arguments that might be stated with 
profit, such as the epistemological argument, the argument from finite 
intelli gence and the argument based upon religious experience, we will 
g iv e room to the discussion only of the moral argument for t h e being 
of God. Pr of.Sorley derives his moral argument for God from the a r-
gument for the existence of values. (11:oral Values and the Idea of God 
Sorley Ch . XIII Page 329 ee). We experience values, and just as we 
experience things of sense and infer their existence, so we a ccept 
the existence of values; -- we assume reality when we experience value. 
Dr. James Orr (Christian View of God and the World,page 108) stat es 
the moral argument a bit differently, he state s with Kant tha t "the mora l 
la w that appears in conscience- 'the categorical imperative' o f duty-
tha t ideal of unrealized goodness which hovers constantly above us,awaken-
ing in us a noble dissatisfac tion with all past attainments; -- these are 
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not f acts wh ich explain themselves. Moral law is not comprehensible 
except as the expression of a will enti t le~ to impose its command up-
on us. The rules and ideals of conduct which conscience reveals to 
us and which bind the will with such unc onditional authority point 
to a deeper source in an eternal moral reason. The ethical ideal, 
if its absolute character is to be secured, points back to an eternal 
ground in the Absolute . Bein~. It takes us back to the same conception 
of God as the ethically perfect Being, source and ground of mora l truth, 
fountain of moral law, which we find to be implied in Christianity.u 
Christianity is a theistic system and postulates as its first 
premise, the pers onal, ethical, self revealing God, Such a Go d dis-
covered to men answers the demands 9f the religious spirit. By self 
revealing God, we mean one who enters into the history of the world in 
a most living way. He is not only actually present in a material uni-
verse,- - ordering, guidi ng , controlling, -- but He enters als o into a 
most direct way in the course of human history, working in its general 
and specific pr ovidence, and by a gradual and pr'ogre s s ive revelation, 
whi ch is at the same time, practical discipline and education, giving 
to man that knowledge of himself by which he is enabled to attain the 
highest ends of his own existence and to cooperate :freely in carrying 
out of divine ends. Thus theism is cold without revelation to complete 
it. The Christian doctrine, while including all that the word theism 
ordinarily covers, is much more than a doctrine of s imple theism. 
'The quest i on next f or our conside~ation is to discover, if 
possible , how this self revealing God can reve a l Himself to His 
world and to His subjects, the infinite to the finit e, the divine 
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to the human. "All genuine first hand religion whe ther of the 
learned or unlearned in the ex l'er ience of a :persona:4; rel ati on to the 
highest.rr (Man and the Cosmos, Leigh ton, :page 549.) Dr. Leighton 
insists this is true even where the highest is not conceived as a 
Person or Personality. It has been found that in :Buddhism re-
dempt l on or salvation is found in a mystical or immedia te union 
of the individual wit h the .A.osolute. It is admitedly true that 
the trancendency (of which we will have more to say later) may 
may be so emphasized, as has been done of times in JuM.i.sm and 
Mohammedanism, and fre~uently in Christianity, as to render the 
object of worship unapproachable to the devotee. V&ile this is 
true yet it is also true that the very heart of relig ion is union 
p r communion or immediate expe~ienca of the devotee with the high-
est. Dr. Leighton :puts this though t in terse form whe n he says: 
"If religious experience be valid, then the worshipers claim to 
know God immediately, by intuition or insight, must be allowed 
reasonable." (Man and the Cosmos, :page 550.) 
To attem1)t to establish the :possi.bility of intercommunication 
between the Infinite Person and finite person, we have already re-
ferred to the traditimnal arguments for the Infinite Person, and 
while none of these arguments severally may amount to a demonstra-
tion yet their culminative effect is to aho w that the theistic postu-
late is not only not irrational but is the most satisfa.ctory solution 
to the riddle of the universe, solving more problems and leaving few-
er unsolved than any other theory. Dispensing with any rene wal of 
these arguments we :posit the existence of the Infinite Person. 
-24-
Neither can we do more than to ass.:t me the existence of the finite 
persons without attempting here to contravert the materialistic 
psychological theories, such as, -- behav~orism, associationalism, 
analythical psychology. We can only make th e final a 1:; peal to self 
consciousness and endeavor to show that only on the basis of finite 
perso nality can life have meaning or society have significance. We 
must postulate the existence of the finite personality. To deny 
the possibility of intercommunication beyween human pera~ns would 
be to make the writing of this paper, or any social system, merely 
a subjective or solipistic exercise. With these three assumptions 
then we launch our argument for intercommunication between nod and 
finite persons. 
We not only contend that within the personalistic argument for 
the Ab solute lies the possibility of intercommunication between per-
sons, but that it is the only argument which is truly compatible 
with the idea of intercommunication or self revelation on the part 
of God. No deistic or agnostic position can be accepted. To postulate 
the per sonality of God in one moment and, in the next to prohibit any 
self revelation of the Deity is, we think, a rational contradiction. 
We believe that it can be shown that agnosticism and deism cannot 
logically stop short of atheism. This we think, James Orr in his 
Christian View of God and the Wor,ld, (Lecture II page 49), has suf-
ficiently demonstrated. "It is here" say;s Orr, "that pantheism has 
its advantage over deism, it is indeed more reasonable to believe in 
a living personal God , who created and who controls the universe, 
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than to believe in the one and all of pantheism, but it does not 
follow that it is more reasonable to believe in an abstract deity,-
a mere figment of the intellect who stands in separat i on from the 
'I.Vorld and yields no satisfaction for the Religious Life." And, to 
~uote Orr again, (Lecture II page 49) the real difficulty is in 
believing "Him to be a God who remains seld-enclosed, impassive, 
uncommunicative towards creatures whom He has dowered with a share 
of His own rational and moral excellencies, who has so shut Himself 
out by natural law from direct contact with the spirits that see 
Him that He ca neither speak to them, answer their prayers, help 
them in trouble nor e v en reach them by inward succors --- a silent 
God, who can no ·:, more enter into personal relation with His 
creatures than if He were impersonal. Such a conception is self-
contradictory and cannot maintain itself." The truly personalistic 
world-ground cannot be thought of deistically. Neither can the 
intercommunicative divine person be viewed from the Hegelian point 
of view. Admitting that Hegel conceived of God as a person, as 
Miss Calkins argues (Persistent Problems of P'ilosophy page 390) 
although his meaning is certainly not clear, yet insuperable prob-
lems remain. In the first place it is difficult to see how a Kon-
sciousness which first b .ecomes aware of itself in you and in me, 
and progressively ins~cesiV~ci generations, can be fairly termed 
personal, and again, even if this can be satisfactorily answered 
it is ~uite impossib le to conce:ive of communication in the true 
sense, between parts of the same personality, and since Hegel re-
duces the universe to a single individual, intercommunica tion is 
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thereby made impossible. There is then, but one clear conception 
of God as a person which is ade~uate. Such a view will insist on 
finding in Him intellect for which there is no opaqueness, and for 
which, certainly nothing which is knowable is unknown; sensibilities 
which will make the life of His creatures meaningful for Him; their 
sorrows and joys, triumphs and failures, find reciproc a tion in Him. 
In this will we find ground for such acts as are characteristic of 
personality, and in these are the grounds for hope of· answer to 
prayer and for providential superintendence. This is the founda-
tion for the Christian view of a personal Holy God as the Author 
of the univ~rse, and its moral Legislator and Ruler . Such a view 
is the only one in which the reason and heart of man can permanent-
ly rest. 
The philosophical basis of communion with God is certainly 
two-fold. In the first p lace the doctrine of divine immanence 
which placed God within the universe, and, for that matter, in some 
sense within human personality itself, would seem to give a nexus 
between God and man, xhe finite and the infinite. It is of course 
at this place that deism fails to have meaning for life. Perhaps 
not wholly aside from the doctrine of immanence, but yet at least 
giving a new approach, is the idealistic conception of the world 
which would remove any crass, brutish matter which might be held 
to oppose the free operation of the infinite spirit upon the world. 
For that matter of co u rse, the God who is creator of the universe 
would not be likely to produce that which would oppose His communi-
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cation with finite personality which He created in His own image. 
The immanence of God, then-- the idealistic ccilnception of 
the universe, as well as revelation, corroborate the mystical ex-
perience of the race relative to the p ossibility of communion with 
God. \'!/hen the immanence of God properly emphasized, the impassable 
gulf between the natural and su~ernatural is seen to be eliminated. 
These terms be come relative and from the new point of view all is 
supernat~al in the sense that God is operative in all His creation. 
It is obvious, then, that from the metaphysical basis there could 
be no objection to aome kind of communion between the finite and 
infinite. The same conclusion is r e ached if we a ccept the postulate 
of idealism, -- there is no materialistic bar to Ga-d"'!~ immediate 
operation on the finite spirit, and, if we go as far as the prin-
c iple of Berkl ey woul d carry us, God is indeed "c.l o ser to us than 
breathing, an d nearer than hands and feet." 
It ~ay be suggeste d that there are two ways of approaching 
the idea of God . First , the way of immediate experience, which 
expresses itself in the feeling of the nearness o f God. It g ives 
to thed.ndividual who thu:;~ appr oaches God, a first hand consciousness 
of His presence . This experience carries its own conviction with it, 
and while it may be classi f ied as mystical, yet it has its value for 
religious life. Sec ond, one may approach the idea of God by wa y of 
phil osophy, which way is consti tuted by a sincere and logical attempt 
to know t he meaning of life as a whole . It seeks to consider life 
and experience not alone by analys is and s~nthesis but from the 
synoptic view point, ~ as a whole. The way of philosophy to God 
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mus t discover the me aning of a ll e mbracing unity of life and its 
meaning, which all embracing unity is found to be i n God. 
It is not wholly co rr ect to contrast these two ways of ap -
proach to God, for philosophy embraces in a certain sense the a ll of 
life, b ot h ap~roaches a re needed without the inclusion of the approach 
by immedia te experience, the philosophical approach mi ght l ead to a 
cold Ab solute. It might wel l be s a id tha t the approach by immediate 
exper ience to God without the corr ective element found in t he philo -
sophical,appr oach might be found of doubtful validity. Both appr oach-
es are intertwined and interwoven . All knowledge rests on b as ic in-
t uit ion, but these are futile unless rela ted to life as a whole . 
The solving of the relati on of God to the finite is e ver 
colored by one -'s philosophical and religious outlook on life. The 
moni stseeks to state the r ela tion of God and ~an i n ~erms of a cat-
e g ory of whole and part . 'rhis ca t egory, however , fa ils of rational 
explanation wh en it attempts to de s.cribe personal relation . "The 
more illuminating cat egory is tha t of purpose whi ch, on our vie w, 
determines tha t wh ole and J?art s shall be i n the universe. The monist 
rightly holds that the d ivine purp ose is supreme but we can g ive a 
sel f consistent inter pretation of the fa cts only on the view that it 
is the divine p~rpose, that there shall be se par a te f inite p ers ons , 
on wh om Go d acts intimately and eonstantly without there being a 
part of Rim . In himself man finds si gns o i God and of Go d 's nearness 
and activity . Yet man is al ways himself and God is God. They are 
mutual l y transcendant in a sense in \Vh.ich God and nature are n o t ." 
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(Introduction to Ph ilosophy, Brightman, page 339.) 
Theism conceived the world of nature as dependent on God 
conceived the worl d of na ture as e xp ressing the wi ll a nd pur p ose 
of God. The ener gy t ha t is at work in the system of physical na ture 
may b est be understood as the will of a supreme person, Stating this 
i n the terms of religion, this is the theory of the immanence of God 
in nature. "The belief in the divine immanence has sweeping impli-
cat ions. If it be true, every motion of every'particle of matter ' 
is nothing more nor less than God Him se lf willing that He and finite 
pe rsons sha ll have experiences of a certain type. Every event in 
n a ture is God's own conscious deed. (Introduction to Philosophy, 
Brightman page 336.) But the fact that God is the metaphysical 
cause for events i n nature does mot necessitate that God is bad, since 
many physical events are ordina rily .judged to be bad. "Phys ical 
events are not g ood or bad in themselves, they are good or bad as 
they express and influence personality." (In t roduction to Philosophy, 
Brightman page 337.) No ev ent re ga rded apart from t he mind t ha t pro-
duces it, can have the quality pf goodness or badness. Only person-
ality ca n sin or be good, physica l eve n ts deriving the ir si gn ificance 
entirely from personality. 
Theism believes i n a God that is purposive, one who is in some 
sense immanent in th e metaphysical cause of e v e;vything in the world 
of nature. One will lies b a ck of the order of na ture and t hie order 
of va lue, one mind is exp~si. ng the mselves in ·both, if this is not 
true Theism would contend that there could be no ultima te meaning for 
-30-
the universe as a whole. 
The Theistic view of God must be found somewhere ·between 
deism and pantheism. Theis_m seeks a gu iding principle for a dis-
crimination of va lues. (Moral Values and The Idea of God, S orley 
page 453.) This primciple is not to be found in the realm of nature 
and its laws nor in that of finite selves and their wills, but is 
found in intrinsic values. The moral order e xpr esses t he d ivine 
nature; and things partake of this nature in so far as they co n -
form to that order, or manifest go odness. This is the key to the 
theistic interpretation of the world. We find that t he moral purpose 
of the world must be th e purpose of the Supre me J;Und, wh ich re gar,ds 
fini te minds as attaining mystical and moral but not eristentia l uni-
ty with t h is Supreme Mind by the pe rfe cting o f their chara cter in co-
operating wi th t he divine purpose. \fuerever ther e is intrinsic worth, 
in the world, as well as in moral g oodness, we may .see a manifesta-
tion of the divine. God must be then conceived of as t he final home 
of values, the Supreme Worth. Whatever value there is, there is mean-
ing to value beyond our ex pe rience of it. The true values of life 
which we experience are ideals of life wh ich derive their existence 
and validity from their presence in the Supreme Person. 
Belief in the obejctivity of value lead s to fa ith in the con-
servation of value, and i f we trust in the cons e rv a tion of value in 
the universe we a re not trusting in man alone. If realized ~~ lues 
are to be cons e rved it must be due, to something in t he order of t h e 
universe wh ich is sympathetic and favo rable to these values. In brief 
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' 
theism is the theory which holds that God is a person whose will is 
expressed in the physical universe, who in His goodness wills ex-
istence of finite persons; who is interested in the conserv a tion 
and increase of value, and u von whom the universe is depending for 
its existence and maintenance. 
"Such as men themselves are, such will God appear to them to 
be . " These words of John Smith, the Cambridge ltonist, express-
es a findamental fact about ~he conditlbion of a religious be l ief from 
which we can nof!ore escape than we ca n " ,; leap p:l' f our own shadows. 11 
11
'l'he God of the moralist is before all things ·a Great ~udge and School 
Master; the God the th e ~riest is the Head of the celestial and ter-
restial hierarchies; the God of science is impersonal and inflexible 
vital Law; the God of the savage is the kind of chief he would be him-
self if he had the opportunity. So closely do gods resemble their 
worshipers that we might almost parody Pope's line and say than an 
honest God is the noblest work of man/ This incurable anthropomorphism 
has been notic e d and ridiculed from Xenophanes to Spinoza. (Personal 
Idealism and Mysticism, Inge, Page 1,2). 
11 Re ligi on depends on faith in God and the kind of re 1 igion one 
has depends on the kind of God one believes in. " (Intorduction to Philo-
sophy, Brightman, Page 329). Be lief in God which emminates from a sin-
cere and thoughtful soul, has positive value for life. It gives him 
hope that in the face of apparent evil, good shall triumph. Such be-
lief encourages one that loves labor is not lost for in God is found 
assuramce of the conservation of value. The kind of a world we think 
this is, will determine for us the kind of life we think is worth 
living. The view wh ich we gold ~f the universe cannot ~~zaxm remain 
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a mere intellectual concept. It ·,cC:b;h:oJ:i.£ every emo tion , it shapes one's 
attitude towards the world and his p e rsonal part in it. If one is 
materialistic he excludes religion and value and g ives himself over 
to bare mencha nism, If one surrenders to absolute idealism he opens 
himself to all the errors of monism. A monism wh ich g ives no ade .uate 
account of the natural order; one which does not make clear the mani-
festation of the Absolute 6ne in the finite many; which involves con-
tradiction in its solving of the relations of the Absolute ~ne is the 
facts of i gnor a nce and evil. 
Absolutism does not answer the problem of free agency s atis-
factorily. ]'inite reasoning an d. wilJ.ing and knowing c a nnot be the 
mere invo 1 untary "Panch and Judy" o f the world's show, through which 
the Vantriloquist can throw His voice. An d lastly, the absolitistic 
conc8J;Iltion pf the developing God is, I think, open to fatal objection. 
The school-boy of the universe has reached a very creditable standing, 
but what of the ,ast? If he has Deen eternally evolving, he must have 
had at some time in tije regress, less than any assignable de g ree of 
knowle dge, etc., however small. This infinite regress of knowledge 
would eventually bring the Ab solute perilously near t he vanishing 
point . Looking toward t h e fu ture we h a ve no guarantee tha t the Absolute 
will be able to endure the the cosmic weather . Such pr oblematic fu ture 
does not s a tisfy the demands o f t he universe. 
Belief in th e God of personalism s eems t o be the "one unifying 
principle that cari make out of our chaotic life a harmonious wh6le of 
t h ought and feeling and action." (Introduction to Philosophy , Br i ght-
man , Page 330 .) The conclusion we reach from the various a rgu ments 
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and cons iderati ons advanced in this treat ment is , that the per-
sonalistic vie w, of the per sonal and h oly God, as the Author 
of the universe, and ~ts moral Le gi sla t or and Ruler, is the 
on ly one in whi ch the reason and hear t of ma n can permanently 
rest. 
- F inis -
-34-
